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**Intercultural Interfaces: Challenging The Pro-Western Bias Of Media History**

On September 14, 1792, the British caricaturist James Gillray published an engraving titled *The Reception of the Diplomatique & his Suite, at the Court of Pekin.* It appeared just before the departure of Lord Macartney's mission to China, organized in the hope of opening up diplomatic and trade relations. In his satirical print Gillray shows a ridiculous selection of miscellaneous gifts for the emperor, including a rat trap, an infant's coral rattle, a toy windmill, a racket, a shuttlecock, a cup with dice – and a magic lantern with a glass slide. It is with these trinkets that the British will, according to Gillray's satirical vision, try to impress the ancient civilization of China.

In other words, the emperor is treated much like the village chief on a remote island who has just been reminded that the outside world exists. The inclusion of the magic lantern cannot be a coincidence. Having been invented in the mid-17th century, it had already become a familiar object, encountered both in the curiosity cabinets of the savants and

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1 This text is a revised version of the paper read at the *Re:place: On the Histories of Media, Art, Science and Technology* conference, House of the World Cultures, Berlin, November 17, 2007.


the cheap shows given by traveling lanternists or 'colporteurs.' It was no longer a novelty in China either, at least at the imperial court, where it had been introduced more than a century earlier by the Jesuit missionary Claudio Filippo Grimaldi.5

Another Jesuit, Jean-Baptiste du Halde, described Grimaldi's magic lantern demonstration in his Description ... de l'Empire de la Chine (1735) as follows:

“Finally he showed [the Emperor] a Tube which contained a burning lamp, whose light exits via the small hole of a tube, at the mouth of which is a telescope lens and in which slide several small glasses painted with various pictures. These same pictures are represented on the wall opposite, smaller or of a prodigious size, according to whether the wall is close or far away. This spectacle during the night or in a very dark place, caused as much fear in those who did not know the art, as it did pleasure in those who had been instructed. It was this which caused it to be given the name Magic Lantern.”6

The reactions of the Chinese spectators to Grimaldi’s projection sound familiar. In fact, it seems that Halde is simply repeating a formula (or topos) he may have found from books about "natural magic." More than sixty years had passed since Grimaldi's presentations.7 Two modes of reception are suggested in Halde's description: in the first, the fascination emerges from the spectator's familiarity with the "trick;" in the second, unfamiliarity with the causes behind the projection creates fear and terror.8 Both strategies have been used

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4 For the early history of the magic lantern, see Deac Rossell's "Magic Lantern: a History, part 1," (Stuttgart: Füsslin Verlag, 2008).
5 To my knowledge there is no information available about the magic lantern's other possible uses in China. Did it develop a tradition? Was it adopted by Chinese showmen? Were magic lanterns ever produced in China? This is one of the lacunae that needs to be filled.
6 Quoted in Laurent Mannoni, The Great Art and Light and Shadow. Archaeology of the Cinema, trans. Richard Crangle, Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2000 (orig.1994), 73. The magic lantern was only one of the “wonders of Optics” with which Father Grimaldi astonished “all the Great Ones of the Empire.”
7 According to Mannoni, Grimaldi, who was in correspondence with Leibniz, may have introduced both the magic lantern and the camera obscura at the Chinese court around 1671-72, when he first arrived to the Chinese capital (Mannoni, 72).
8 Pierre Petit, who was familiar with the Dane Walgenstein and the Dutch Huygens, who were among the very first to use the magic lantern (Huygens is often considered its inventor sometime before 1659), gave it the name lanterne du peur ("lantern of fear") (Mannoni, 48).
countless times by westerners – missionaries, educators, tradesmen, politicians - to impress, frighten, and discipline other peoples and cultures.

Let me mention another example. In a travel account from 1827, an anonymous writer [a British diplomat] describes how the British ambassador to Persia (Iran) used western technology to impress the Persians. He had first demonstrated an electric shock machine. After it had lost its fascination by becoming too familiar as an attraction, the ambassador had purchased a phantasmagoria magic lantern, giving performances as part of his mission. Phantasmagoria, a ghost show, was the state of the art of the magic lantern technology at the time. Soon “old and young, rich and poor were in raptures.” The device not only convinced the locals of western technological superiority; the magic lantern amusement also helped to ‘break the ice,’ subverting the rigid diplomatic conventions by creating a relaxed atmosphere. Convinced about the workability of the ambassador’s idea, the author recommends “phantasmagorias, or something similar, as of essential importance to the success of all future embassies to Persia!”

Whether factually accurate or not, these discursive fragments enact a familiar pattern: when it comes to the history of technology (in this case, "media technology"), the west has been positioned, over and over again, as the nexus from which technological innovations emanate to the rest of the world. In a recent, highly polemical book, the renowned anthropologist Jack Goody accuses Europe – including European scholars - of "The Theft of History." For Goody, in the European tradition "the east is ignored, oral cultures unconsidered." Goody discusses the cultural "force feeding" of topics like space and time, capitalism, science and technology, concluding that European scholars have

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9 It is also possible that the author used "phantasmagoria" as a generic term for the normal magic lantern. Philip Carpenter in England had introduced his "Improved Phantasmagoria Lantern" c.1821. It had little to do with the special equipment (fantascopes) created for the phantasmagoria proper. For more about phantasmagoria, see Mervyn Heard, Phantasmagoria: The Secret Life of the Magic Lantern, Hastings, East Sussex: The Projection Box, 2006. See also my critical commentary on Heard's work, "Ghost Notes: Reading Mervyn Heard's Phantasmagoria. The Secret Life of the Magic Lantern," The Magic Lantern Gazette, Vol.18, N:o 4 (Winter 2006), 10-20.


11 Sketches of Persia, 183.

"stolen history by imposing their categories and sequences on the rest of the world." In academic discourse, the idea of the European supremacy has been re-enacted over and over again. In one of the most extreme formulations of this idea, the historian H.R. Trevor-Roper asserts that "the history of the world, for the last five centuries, in so far as it has significance, has been European history."\

Even in those rare cases in which a western authority has clearly acknowledged the achievements and primacy of a non-western culture, Goody detects problems. Joseph Needham's massive multi-volume classic *Science and Civilization in China* (1954-) demonstrates the breath of the achievements of the Chinese civilization during thousands of years, providing a massive argument against Europe as the origin of all significant and influential things. However, even Needham ran into a dilemma, which has come to be known as the "Needham problem." According to Needham, in spite of the Chinese achievements, the west took the lead from the 16th century onwards. For Needham, the primary cause was the emergence of private enterprise and the bourgeoisie from the Renaissance onward, which created a favorable environment for the sciences to flourish. The Chinese society remained stifled by the rigid bureaucracy that did not allow competition and open scientific discussion. This explanation has not been universally accepted; the Needham problem is still debated.

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13 Goody, 304. Such eurocentrism was – unawares - even present in Siegfried Zielinski's invited lecture at the Re:place conference, Berlin 2007. Zielinski called for studies that "should go eastwards and southwards," implying Europe as the center point.
14 Goody, 1.
18 As Shigeru Nakayama has noted, Needham also emphasized the impact of the Christian monotheistic tradition, which assigned common origins to the human natural law and the laws of Nature. Under monotheism and absolute monarchy, "the search for the laws of Nature has developed the same significance as obedience to natural law." (Shigeru Nakayama, "Joseph Needham, Organic Philosopher," in *Chinese Science*, 41.) What about the Greek science under polytheism, Nakayama asks.
Media History Beyond Eurocentrism

What is clear is that the European attitudes toward other cultures haven't been disinterested. On the contrary, they have served political, economic, educational-propagandistic and cultural-hegemonistic goals, often enmeshed with each other. It might even be suggested that westerners have, at least in some cases, striven to install among other cultures a model that cultural anthropologists call 'cargo cults.' This notion refers to a complex of indigenous practices and symbolic manifestations that see the western "overseas" civilization – represented by the trade boats or cargo planes appearing from the horizon and disappearing there again - as the source of everything desirable. The western things that have been seen, but are largely beyond the reach of the native population, become re-enacted in tribal rituals and provided with symbolic, even magic, qualities. It may seem a questionable leap to try to connect the island cultures of the Pacific, where 'cargo cults' first developed, with the court of the Prince of Persia, who develops an ardent desire to possess the British ambassador's phantasmagoria lantern, but whose offers are turned down (no doubt due to cunning calculation by the diplomats – a sustained desire serves their goals better than a satisfied one). Of course, these cultural contexts are hugely different and cannot be compared as such. Still, in both cases the west is positioned as the cultural Other, an abode of miraculous inventions, and wealth.

I agree with Goody that eurocentric historical narratives are suspicious. Do they really tell the whole (hi)story? Could it be told differently, releasing the non-westerners from their peripheral and passive roles? Isn't it missing something essential: the accounts by the non-western cultural agents themselves? Goody demonstrates that many innovations and traditions have appeared elsewhere before they came to the attention of the Europeans. How can this multiplicity be taken into account? How can the different perspectives be brought together, constructing more 'truthful' narratives of cultural contributions, migrations, influences, and mergers?
This paper will make some suggestions by concentrating on the history of "media" and "media culture." As almost any existing book bearing these words in its title discloses, the history of media has been a particularly western "affair." A case in point, Asa Briggs's and Peter Burke's *A Social History of the Media* (2002) bears the telling subtitle "From Gutenberg to the Internet." Although the "A" in the title reminds the reader that the authors have written just one possible version, non-western developments (save for a few references to China and Japan) almost no role in the nearly 400-page volume. Starting from the Gutenbergian print revolution and its context, the book proceeds to discuss the media and the public sphere in early modern Europe [sic], continuing to topics like steam and electricity, information, education and entertainment, and finally cyberspace.

That media history can be assessed from a very different perspective is demonstrated by Timon Screech’s path-breaking book *The Lens Within the Heart. The Western Scientific Gaze and Popular Imagery in Later Edo Japan*. Strictly speaking, Screech does not purport to write "media history." His goal is to investigate the vicissitudes of western scientific (particularly optical) knowledge in Japan during the relatively isolated Edo period (1603-1868). It is commonly thought that during these centuries the Japanese had very little communication with the outside world, which explains the very peculiar nature of the Edo-era culture. Screech shows that more western knowledge and technology ended up in the remote island nation than has been thought. Far from being passive, the Japanese actively integrated pieces of western learning into their own cultural habits, practices and imaginaries. Screech expresses his mission succinctly:

“Our inner theme is international encounter - the existence and compulsion of ‘the foreign’ within a native space. We shall consider how one cultural cluster - Japan (federal and disparate as it was at this time) - used another in the building up of its proper self. The case is made that this encounter provoked a change in

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Japan that particularly related to systems of visual awareness - indeed, to a reassessment of the entire faculty of sight.  

The Japanese contribution was not limited merely to the discursive; it manifested itself also in material forms, such as the karakuri (wooden doll automata) and the Utsushi-e, the Japanese magic lantern show that combined features from Asian shadow theatre, the western magic lantern show and Japanese popular storytelling, leading to an original cultural form. The Japanese did not slavishly imitate foreign influences; they adapted and synthesized them with their own ideas, gradually laying the foundations for later technological and cultural achievements that were eventually exported to other parts of the world.

Western accounts are usually lacking an awareness of the extent, length and depth of such processes. The Japanese contributions to today's media culture are considered important, but usually understood as something very recent, a post-World War II development. They are often explained as successful imitations of foreign influences. It is rarely understood, for example, that popular cultural forms like manga and anime contain elements – techniques, themes, narrative strategies - that have been developing within the Japanese context for a very long time. The encounter with western comics, animated films, and other forms of 20th century popular culture inspired the Japanese to re-activate these traditions and to develop them further into forms that match contemporary mentalities; they did not suddenly appear out of nowhere.

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21 Although he mentions magic lanterns in Japan, Screech does not deal with Utsushi-e. For an introduction, see the excellent website on Utsushi-e created by Professor Machiko Kusahara from Waseda University, http://plaza.bunka.go.jp/bunka/museum/kikaku/exhibition02/english/index-e.html . The website also contains my short article “Utsushi-e, The Japanese Magic Lantern Show”. The nearly extinct tradition has been recently revived by the theatre group Minwa-za (Tokyo) and others.

22 This is a point the well-known Japanese contemporary artist Takashi Murakami has been constantly making, in relation both to his own work and to the Japanese popular culture that has influenced him. See Murakami's book Superflat, Tokyo: Madra Publishing Co, 2000.

Toward A Comparative Approach To Media History

As the rise of the "New Historicism" has made clear, historical writing cannot escape the valuations and perceptions of the (changing) present. However, neither should it turn them into a mold superimposed on the past. A theoretically-informed dynamics has to be created between these two poles. Under the present increasingly global media-cultural condition, histories that are conceived a priori as western-centered have become untenable. However, trying to correct the situation by merely casting a “multi-cultural” mold over the past, thereby replacing singularity with a pretended plurality (in other words, amending eurocentric media history with a conglomeration of local "media histories"), would be insufficient. What is needed is a qualitative re-orientation – a history that takes into account cross-cultural exchanges and influences.

Such a history should not focus only on hard material facts, such as the evolution of media technology, but also on local ways of thinking and discursive adaptations. Some cultures may not have developed gadgets that would qualify as "media technology" in the western sense. They may, however, have created other cultural forms that have served similar functions. These functions may also be something different, emerging from the needs and concerns of the local context. One also needs to consider the symbolic and the discursive. The tribal "cargo cultists" who produced their own bricolage versions of western devices as they understood them, and used them in their rituals, weaving mythological narratives around them, participated in a "media culture" of sorts. To be able to account for phenomena like this, media history needs to look beyond its boundaries toward other disciplines.

Useful models can be found from cultural and visual anthropology and comparative cultural studies. Significantly, Goody, who calls himself "an anthropologist (or comparative sosiologist)," proposes "an anthropo-archaeological approach to modern

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Cultural anthropology has for a long time been learning to deal with the complexities and pitfalls of cross-cultural encounters. The relationship between the observer and the observed is never without problems, particularly when it entails overcoming complex issues of power, cultural difference, and economic inequality. When it comes to visual anthropology, the writings of Eric Michaels about the intricate relationships between the Australian aborigines, western media technology, the Australian government, the immigrant population, and the cultural anthropologist (an in/outside) provide a theoretically sophisticated example. Unfortunately, unlike the cultural anthropologist, the historian does not enjoy an opportunity of doing fieldwork. The historian patches the explanation together from sources that are heterogeneous and fragmentary. When it comes to cross-cultural communication that may have happened in the distant past, heuristic problems can be extremely complex. A certain amount of speculation cannot be avoided.

What comparative cultural approaches can achieve is demonstrated by Victor H. Mair’s celebrated book *Painting and Performance. Chinese Picture Recitation and Its Indian Genesis* (1988). Mair's work began as a narrowly focused study about a genre of Chinese popular literature known as pien-wen (“transformation texts”) from the T’ang period (618-906). The project broadened up into a vast cultural and geographic mapping of the migration routes of ‘picture recitation’ or ‘visual storytelling,’ spanning thousands of years. According to Mair's persuasive, but necessarily tentative conclusion, the original ‘home’ of such traditions may have been ancient India, from where they spread to all directions, transforming themselves as they gradually merged with local influences.

None of the cultural vectors Mair has identified originated in Europe. There is a European tradition as well, often known with the German concepts Bänkelsang (bench or platform singing) or Moritat. It was a popular 'nomadic show' that blossomed by the

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25 Goody, 3, 287.
eighteenth century, and continued as late as the early twentieth century. A storyteller, who stood on a platform sang stories and pointed at pictures, which his companions played music and sold sheets of song lyrics to the spectators. The topics often dealt with recent sensational event, so the Bänkelsang was a kind of news medium as well as entertainment. As a “screen practice” it bears similarities with older Asian traditions of visual storytelling that most likely influenced it. Another western media-cultural phenomenon, the moving panorama show, which displayed large and long rolls of paintings, may have been equally influenced by Asian models, such as the Javanese Wayang bèbèr, although no direct connecting links have been found to date.

Comparative methods can be used to trace the trajectories of visual cultural forms such as the shadow theatre and the peep-show. Both can be encountered in ‘localized’ forms in cultural and ethnic contexts over wide geographic areas. While the former’s origins are clearly Asian, the latter may have originated in the occident, and disseminated along trade routes, being adopted and reinterpreted by the different cultures along the way. Traces of peep-show practices can be found at least from Egypt, Syria, India, Singapore, China, Russia, Japan, Europe, and Northern America. Although the peep-show 'apparatus' is often technically quite uniform (implying that the versions encountered in different contexts did not develop in isolation from each other), their external designs vary according to local traditions and aesthetics.

What peep-show boxes contained is a problem for the historian. Some Chinese and Japanese ones displayed "foreign views," which may point to their foreign origins. A Japanese illustration from 1782 shows a peep-showman doing his business. Advertising boards affixed on the box read: Oranda o-garakuri; “Great Dutch Karakuri”. Peering

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28 The concept “screen practice” was coined by Charles Musser, see his Emergence of the Cinema: The American screen to 1907, History of the American cinema, vol.1, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994, chapter one, “Towards a History of Screen Practice”.
30 Based on the information collected by the author from various sources, including visual representations.
31 See Screech, The Lens within the Heart, 121. "Nozoki karakuri" was the Japanese name for the peep-show box.
into the peephole offered a momentary escape from one's physical surroundings, a curious optical trip into a foreign land that was physically out of reach. So far the cross-cultural trajectories of the peep-show have received little scholarly attention. One of the reasons may be the status of the peep-show as a street entertainment. While the shadow theatre had important social, cultural and religious functions that have helped to preserve its memory and its exhibition practices, to our day, the peep-show was considered as something ephemeral and 'cheap.' In spite of its wide cultural presence, it has left few traces behind.

What Constitutes A "Medium"?

The quest for cross-cultural comparative media history forces us to reconsider the meanings of “media” and "media culture." These concepts developed in the west reflecting occidental ideas; therefore they should not be superimposed on other cultures without scrutiny. Some cases may be easier than others. It is perhaps not be too far-fetched to use the word "peep-media" as a general term, as I have done in another context. "Peep-media" existed in many contexts and forms, yet in spite of local differences these nevertheless resembled each other. The peep-show box is an apparatus (a "media machine") designed for viewing visual representations, often enhanced by ‘visual effects,’ such as motion and 'atmospheric' transformations. The peep-show is a "media cultural" phenomenon, because it offered "mediated" experiences that were visually and experientially separated from the continuum of everyday experience.

34 See Raymond Williams, Keywords, London: Fontana, 1984 (orig.1976), 203-204. For Williams, in the mid-20th century the concept “media” “became widely used when broadcasting as well as the press had become important in communications.” Although the plural form had been available since the mid 19th century, its development “probably” happened in the context of describing the newspaper as a medium for advertising.
Enclosed in a box and "entered" optically (by eyes only), the pictures provided "virtual voyaging" experiences, to use an anachronism.\textsuperscript{36} It should also be pointed out that the practice of peeping is still present in contemporary media culture, most obviously in the "logic of attractions" used by commercial websites (particularly erotic ones) that try to seduce the user by windows with tiny thumbnail pictures or animations, persuading him/her to "enter" them by paying a fee (the credit card has replaced the coins handed to the peep-showman).\textsuperscript{37} How this phenomenon may be linked with the peep-shows of the past is a historiographical and cultural-theoretical problem.

Can the shadow theatre be considered a “medium” as well? Isn’t it rather a performative genre, a form of ritual theatre?\textsuperscript{38} Does the addition of magic lantern projections to the shadow theatre in the Japanese \textit{Utsushi-e} turn it into a medium – also because \textit{Utsushi-e} was more clearly a form of entertainment? How about ‘visual storytelling’ – can a peripatetic singer explaining pictures at a marketplace be characterized as a kind of ‘media artist’ \textit{avant la lettre}? Applied to cross-cultural contexts, the concept “media” must also cover cultural forms that deal with communication, but don’t necessarily replace the physical human element with something mediated and virtual. The use of advanced "media technology" should not be considered an absolute criterion either, nor should one require the existence of institutional media networks for the dissemination and

\textsuperscript{36} Jonathan Crary, analyzing William Hogarth's \textit{Southwark Fair} (1730s), has noted the presence of the peep-show box as one of the attractions of the fair. For him, it is an index pointing toward the development of the modern enclosed and privatized spectatorship, and the fading of the carnival. Crary ignores the peep-show's cross-cultural dimension, dealing with it in an exclusively western context. Would it make sense to claim that a peep-show displayed in a 19th century Indian village or at a 1950s Japanese popular fair announced isolated modern spectatorship as well? The spectators of the peep-show at an 18th century fair may not have been as isolated from the surrounding "carnival" as Crary thinks. The experience was momentary, the sounds from the outside formed a continuum and physical contact between the peepers was commonplace. These factors kept the peeping experience firmly tied to the carnival. As before, Crary's argument suffers from his refusal to consider such contextual factors. See Jonathan Crary, "Géricault, the Panorama, and Sites of Reality in the Early Nineteenth Century," \textit{Grey Room}, 09 (Fall 2002), 7-8.

\textsuperscript{37} Many peep-show boxes had pictures attached on the outside as "teasers" for things waiting inside the box. This practice is related to other forms of "the culture of attractions," such as the ads hanging outside fairground tents and eventually the posters at the entrance to cinema theatres, as well as billboards. About other manifestations of peeping in contemporary media culture, see Clay Calvert, \textit{Voyeur Nation. Media, Privacy, and Peering in Modern Culture}, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2004.

\textsuperscript{38} Imported to Europe since the late 17th century, probably via Italy, the shadow theatre became more clearly a form of commercial spectacle and eventually also a domestic pastime.
exchange of messages as an absolute criterion. If we agree about this, the shadow theatre may be regarded a “medium,” because it uses audiovisual modes of representation to communicate complex meanings that have social, cultural, and aesthetic relevance for the audience.\footnote{For an analysis of such complexities, see Ward Keeler, \textit{Javanese Shadow Plays, Japanese Selves}, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987.} It matters less that the messages are produced in real-time by a living person manipulating puppets behind a screen. The shadow theatre may not be a ‘technology’ in the western sense, but it can be characterized as a cultural ‘technique.’

The idea of "media culture" should not be limited to material forms only. Things material are always related with things immaterial – the dream worlds of culture, to paraphrase Walter Benjamin. Traditional modes of visual representation may therefore also function as ‘media,’ because they inspire discursive "media-related" manifestations that live their own lives within the fabric of culture. In \textit{The Double Screen. Medium and Representation in Chinese Painting} the art historian Wu Hung discusses the wide range of meanings that surround the Chinese tradition of painted screens.\footnote{Wu Hung, \textit{The Double Screen. Medium and Representation in Chinese Painting}, London: Reaktion Books, 1996. See also Craig Clunas, \textit{Pictures and Visuality in Early Modern China}, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997.} Far from being just material artifacts (pieces of furniture and works of "art"), their meanings delved deep into the cultural imaginary. Painted screens provided virtual extensions to the physical environment, 'enveloping' persons in front of them (the emperor was depicted ritually posing in front of a painted screen, the colors and ornaments of his clothes merging with those of the screen). They also served as imaginary gateways to other realms. Although many of the uses and meanings associated with Chinese screens strike the western mind as alien and exotic, it is worth trying to see beyond or through them. The screens Wu Hung discusses are not "screens" in the western media-cultural sense (surfaces for displaying dynamic visual data), but they nevertheless transmit codified visual messages and cultural meanings that are recognized by the cultural agents.\footnote{About western notions of the screen, see Anne Friedberg's \textit{The Virtual Window}, Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 2007.}
Extending 'Media' Without Imploding It?

Extending the notion "media" too far and wide may cause problems. If any kind of visual form can be interpreted as a "medium," the concept of media may implode, or turn into an empty shell. We should not forget to ask: What is “media culture”? What does it cover? Where and when did it begin? It may sound reasonable to assume that to have any meaning at all, the concept "media" should be reserved only for describing a certain, fairly recent, cultural condition that has developed in "technologically advanced societies," and that is related with ideas such as “‘society of spectacle” (Debord), “cultural industry” (Adorno and Horkheimer) or “hyperreality” (Baudrillard). In most pre-twentieth century societies such a condition simply did not exist. How can one possibly claim that “media” may be applied to describe also such "primitive" circumstances?42 The answer is tentative, and subject to debate. As media-archaeologists, including myself, have attempted to show, the “deep time of the media” (Zielinski) extends far longer than has been normally thought.43 However, it should not be forgotten that the use of communication and "media" extends laterally as well - across cultures, continents and traditions, connecting things that seem separate, or even nonexistent. We may argue that what is commonly understood as “media culture” is really part of (a) larger cultural formation(s), the outlines of which we are only beginning to perceive.44

It is here that the real challenges begin. Here is the basic question: how can we write “global” media history within and between cultural environments that don’t share the same goals, concepts, interests, scholarly traditions and theories, and even the same

42 One answer has been provided by artists bridging media and indigenous traditions. A good example are the works by the Indonesian artist Heri Dono. Dono’s art has combined traditional Indonesian Wayage shadow theatre with contemporary media.
44 I cannot resist quoting Jack Goody's critique of current cultural studies, which may well apply to media studies as well: "The field of cultural studies, both in its British and its American variants, is chaotic. The textual base of the latter is virtually exclusively western writings, usually philosophers, often French, who comment upon life without offering much data except their own internal reflections or comments upon other philosophers, all representative of modern, urban societies. The level of generality of such comments is such that one has no real need of information to enter into the conversation." (Goody, 305).
Supposing that the issues outlined in this article are worth pursuing further, the question of scholarly collaboration across borders emerges. Comparative media history does not exist as an internationally recognized discipline. Researchers who have important things to contribute have different scholarly backgrounds; they live far apart, and may not know about each other. Not all of them are media scholars or even historians. How can we locate them, connect them, and create polylogues between them? An international conference is a starting point, but it is a rather conservative and problematic idea. An international on-line forum would be a better opening, but it has its problems as well, including the dominant role of English in on-line communication on the internet. Whatever form the collaboration would take, it should start by addressing some basic questions. What is "media," and how is it understood in different cultural contexts? How can we write media history simultaneously from multiple cultural perspectives, and adjust these with each other? Finally, and perhaps most importantly, is such a “total” approach possible, or even desirable?

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45 Gunalan Nadarajan’s article “Islamic Automation: A Reading of al-Jazari’s The Book of Knowledge of Ingenious Mechanical Devices (1206)”, in MediaArtHistories, edited by Oliver Grau, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2006, 163-178 is a useful opening to this direction.

46 It can naturally profit from the work done within comparative cultural studies. A spin-off of cultural studies, MIT's Comparative Media Studies program, also tries to encourage "thinking across media forms, theoretical domains and cultural contexts," but its primary focus is not media history (see www.cms.mit.edu).